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This paper investigates some individual career choices in China, Germany and the US 
that have an impact on economic innovation. It presents evidence that public 
administration in China attracts highly educated and talented people, while those who 
create firms tend to have low educational attainment and do not stand out in terms of 
talent. In contrast, Americans of  high ability tend to go in the private sector either as 
employees or as entrepreneurs. While education generates attractive  alternatives to 
creating one's own firm, educated American entrepreneurs are highly successful, 
suggesting that they engage in frontier innovation. We then discuss some policy 
recommendations that may help increase the attractiveness of creating one’s own firm 








Occupational choice and the allocation of talent in an economy are crucial for 
economic innovation. In this paper, we relate these issues to economic culture and 
investigate two related sets of questions in a comparative study including China, 
Germany and the US.  
The first set of questions focuses on who are the people creating new firms 
and what is the profile of those who are successful.  Considerable academic and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that innovators introduce new products, techniques, and 
technologies by creating their own firms. Furthermore, small firms account for a large 
share of total employment worldwide. For example, in the US more than 60 per cent 
of the workforce is employed in firms of less than 1000 employees. Next, we try to 
investigate the educational credentials, inherent ability or talent, and beliefs and 
attitudes make an entrepreneur successful and how that set of characteristics compares 
to those that led them to create firms in the first place.  
The second set of questions is related to the choice to become low- or 
medium-level government administrators. In developed economies, the state employs 
between 12 and 20 per cent of the workforce and a large share of them are low and 
medium level civil servants with little to no labour mobility. In China, that percentage 
is  even higher. In many countries working as a civil servant has a long tradition of 
prestige, along with very advantageous pay and good retirement plans. One concern 
that arises in such countries is that the state may be attracting the best and the 
brightest into jobs that generate less value added than some alternative jobs in the 
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private sector. In this context, we are interested to see whether the hiring policy of the 
government administrators has the unintended consequence of depriving the rest of 
the economy of much-needed talent.  
We investigate these questions using data from the World Value Survey 
covering the periods 1996 – 2002 and 2005-2006. Our empirical analysis is based on 
the classical Roy Model of occupational choice, but along with the traditional 
demographic characteristics of the individuals we also include a set of variables that 
represent individual beliefs and attitudes about work and the economy, as well as a set 
of variables that capture prevailing views in the community.  
Our main result suggests that civil service careers attract highly educated 
people with high inherent ability, and their pay is largely determined by educational 
degree and seniority with very little variation due to differences in inherent ability. At 
the same time, people with high educational attainment are less likely to create their 
own firms, and the individuals who do so do not stand out in terms of their inherent 
ability from the rest of the population. Furthermore, education does not appear to have 
any effect on the successfulness of the company. Chinese entrepreneurs also appear to 
be influenced by the economic values prevailing in the community.  
In the US in contrast, while government positions still attract highly educated 
people, the more talented individuals enter the private sector or create their own firm 
rather than take positions in public administration. They also tend to have attractive 
alternatives to entrepreneurship, which results in a decline in the probability of 
creating a firm with higher education after a bachelor’s degree. However, conditional 
on creating a firm, its success, measured by the income of the founder, increases 
monotonically with education. Moreover, there is very strong evidence that the people 
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with the highest inherent ability tend to create their own companies. These findings 
suggest that American start-ups are education/skill intensive and as such are likely to 
involve the creation of products, technologies or techniques that are completely new. 
Furthermore, we find that Americans with a drive for achievement a and willingness 
to contribute to the welfare of the larger community are very likely to create new 
firms and are also likely to succeed.  
Germany appears to be somewhere in between the US and China. Selection 
into civil service in Germany has very similar pattern to that in the US. However, 
while the demographic pattern for those who create new firms is also similar to that in 
the US, we find that higher education does not have a positive effect on the income of 
the entrepreneur. Also, we find no positive selection into entrepreneurship on the 
basis of inherent talent. These evidence suggest that, as in China, entrepreneurship in 
Germany is related to the adoption on a local level of already existing products, 
technologies, and techniques. Interestingly, we note that individual beliefs and 
attitudes play a crucial role in the career decisions of Germans. 
Our analysis provides the base for some limited policy recommendations. In 
the context of China, we suggest several policy directions intended to increase 
economic innovation. The basic goal of these suggestions is to improve the relative 
attractiveness of the private sector and entrepreneurship relative to jobs in low and 
medium-level public administration, while maintaining the quality of the public 
services. With respect to public administration, we suggest that the implementation of 
information technology and the creation of an ‘electronic government’ can eliminate 
the need for many low and intermediate level administrative positions, streamline 
documentation and requirements, and decrease processing time. Moreover, the 
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introduction of such a system could be the first step on the road to the adoption of real 
time policy analysis using the accumulated ‘big data’. 
With respect to entrepreneurship, we recognize that new businesses receive 
credit at high interest rates and that very often their founders lack skills in financial 
and business planning. These issues suggest the need for specialized institutions that 
can help entrepreneurs develop their financial and business plan and that can then 
match them with potential venture capitalists. Another way to increase access to credit 
and decrease interest rates is by creating institutions that could securitise loans to 
small and medium-size firms, similar to the government-sponsored US mortgage 
enterprises,. The other major barrier to entry and successful growth of small 
companies is their small scale of operation, which prevents them from gaining in 
productivity from specialization and scale. We think that the emerging ‘sharing 
economy’ could help start-ups overcome these disadvantages through shared use of 
assets and services.  
Ultimately, we recognize that there appears to be no clear recipe for 
entrepreneurial success and that most people learn what works and what does not 
through trial and error. This conclusion implies that business education should be 
more oriented towards learning-by-doing, through simulation games and case studies, 
accumulation of experience in firms, and training. 
Our work relates to a large literature on economic innovation and here we 
provide only a few basic references. Economic innovation has been central in many 
macroeconomic models in growth theory, particularly those that followed from the 
Schumpeterian tradition.  The seminal paper Aghion and Howitt (1992) provides an 
early example of this literature. Most recently,  Acemoglu and Cao (2011), Aghion, 
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Howitt and Prantl (2012) and Akcigit, Hanley, and Serrano-Velarde (2012) extend the 
basic model of this literature by developing increasingly more realistic specification 
of research and development. The macroeconomic framework has also given rise to 
several micro firm-level studies testing key predictions of the models, such as Aghion, 
Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt (2005), Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, Prantl 
(2006).  Another strand in the literature is based entirely on reduced form micro 
studies based on firm-level data. Recently, there have been several studies on the 
operations of firms based on US census data with Haltiwangler, Jarmin, Miranda 
(2009) and Qian (2007) being two of the more prominent examples.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 motivates our work 
and presents our empirical framework. Section 3 summarizes the data and section 4 
presents our results. Section 5 presents our policy recommendations and section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Motivation and Model Framework 
We consider two interrelated career choices: the selection into low and medium level 
government administration and the decision to create a new firm. Conditional on these 
choices, we then examine income. The effects of the following factors on the choice 
and the resulting income are of primary interest to us: education, inherent ability, 
individual beliefs and attitudes, and the prevailing economic values in the society. To 





2.1 Creation of New Firms 
We focus on the creation of new firms for two reasons. New firms are one of the main 
channels for the introduction of new products, technologies and production 
techniques. This is an empirical fact in most countries. Two economic explanations 
provide a rationalization for this phenomenon. The first one is related to agency 
problems. The employees of a company may be reluctant to share their ideas with 
their superiors because they may be afraid that at best the latter will want to share the 
future benefits and at worst they may try to steal them, or improve upon the original 
and propose a better alternative. Moreover, to be realized, the individual idea will 
have to become a joint project for the whole firm, entailing a loss of control and a loss 
of a unique claim on all the subsequent profits. All of these considerations may entice 
an employee with a novel idea to quit his or her job and create a new firm to develop 
and try their idea in practice. 
 The other explanation of the empirical regularity is more subtle. Ideas at their 
initial stages hinge on intuitions, past experiences, imagination, and outright leaps of 
faith. No centralized hierarchical system, private or public, would consent to make its 
life and death decisions on such a basis. Common past experiences, shared views, 
mutual trust, nonverbal communication are a few of the factors that determine 
whether one individual can share his idea with another. Unfortunately, or fortunately, 
no government agency or private firm, i.e.  a hierarchical centralized decision-making 
entity,  allows such forms of communication across different hierarchical levels. 
Indeed, centralization requires unification and formalization of communication, which 
makes it uniquely unsuitable for the purpose of sharing and developing the original 
ideas of a subordinate. This communication issue implies that centralized hierarchical 
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structures may be well-suited for many tasks but trying out new things is not one of 
them. We do not say that they are necessarily hostile to innovation, we just say that 
hierarchical structures and centralized decision-making are not predisposed to be 
receptive to new ideas and change.  
 When considered together, these two factors  may explain why so many 
people, across the world, have chosen to create firms for the purpose of testing their 
ideas in practice. In fact, we believe that almost all firms are created because their 
founders wanted to try out something new: it is hard to believe that someone would 
bear all the risk and forgo a secure income for the purpose of replicating what a 
neighbour does already. At this stage, it is worth mentioning that we distinguish, just 
as the Schumpeterian tradition does, between different types of innovation. In 
particular, we distinguish between frontier innovation and adoption. As the names 
themselves suggest, frontier innovation relates to the creation of new products, 
technologies, and techniques that are new in the context of the whole world, while 
adoption relates to their subsequent spread across different economies.  
 Once a new idea is implemented successfully, the innovators have a choice: to 
sell the business and the claims on future profits to a large established company, to 
establish a long-term contractual relation with an established large company, or to 
compete with the established firms. The choice depends on the industry and its 
characteristics: in the IT sector, developers usually sell their successful products or 
business to large companies; in manufacturing, new firms usually develop products, 
parts, machines, or technologies which are related to existing products or production 
lines, so the usual choice of new firms is to enter into an exclusive long-term 
contractual relation with an established company. Competing with the established 
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firms is rare for various reasons: absence of sufficient credit, competition with the 
incumbents is not profitable, labour market restrictions, etc. 
 We are also interested in the motivations behind start-ups because the 
resulting small and medium-size companies are a major provider of employment in 
both industrializing and developed countries. For example, according to the US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics, slightly more than 60 per cent of the employed work in 
firms of less than 1000 employees.  In Germany, small and medium-size companies, 
the so-called mittelstand companies, have a long, proud, and successful history.  Thus, 
small and medium-size companies account for more than half of the employment and, 
as a result,  they provide the foundations of strong domestic consumption in these 
countries. 
 
2.2 Who Wants to be a Civil Servant? 
The other issue that we study in this paper is the selection of individuals into low and 
medium level administrative jobs in the public sector. In short, we are interested in 
what kind of person decides to become a bureaucrat and for what reasons. We exclude 
from our analysis high level managerial positions in the public sector because their 
career dynamics and obligations are distinctly different from that of low or medium 
level administrators. In the developed countries, high level managers in the private 
sector are often invited to senior government positions, and they return to the private 
sector after their term expires. In China, due to the large share of the economyunder 
direct or indirect government supervision, the high-level managerial positions involve 
great responsibility and the resulting decisions affect the lives of many.  
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  Numerous studies show that once people enter the civil service at a low or 
medium-level position they usually stay in the civil service. Also, many studies show 
that people in low and medium-level government positions generate lower value 
added than they would have done in a job in the private sector. So althought the work 
of  public administration is vital for the  smooth functioning of the economy and the 
well-being of a nation’s citizens, the question arises: do societies optimally allocate 
their scarce human talent?  
 There is much academic and anecdotal evidence to the effect that workers 
learn most about how to perform their duties on the job. This certainly seems to be the 
case for filling in government forms, their processing, and the application of 
administrative procedures and practices. In such cases, the returns to higher education 
must be very low in comparison with what an individual can accomplish in a non-
administrative position. If the best and brightest in a country decide to go for an 
administrative position, one may doubt to what extent their choice is socially optimal 
from the perspective of generating the maximum social return on an education. The 
same argument applies not only to education but also to inherent ability or talent and 
other individual characteristics.  
 Of course, people do not make their occupational choice in isolation from the 
incentives that the government provides through its compensation and retirement 
policy for administrators, nor in isolation from the competition for each position. We 
also recognize that in many societies there is a great prestige and non-pecuniary 
rewards associated with the status of civil servants. People make their choices by 
comparing the costs and benefits associated with administrative and non 
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administrative work. Thus, it is the government employment policy that is at least 
partially responsible for the resulting selection of talent in the economy.  
 Naturally, when the brightest and the best end-up in medium level 
administrative positions, the pool of talent that is available for other purposes, in 
particular economic innovation and the creation of start-ups decreases. Indeed, in the 
extreme, if the government administration is sufficiently large, it can suck up all the 
talent in the economy, leading to low economic innovation and, as a result, mediocre 
economic performance.  
 
2.3 Economic Values 
The opening of new trade routes in the 15th and 16th century, the financial 
innovations of the 14th-17th century and the first Industrial Revolution undermined 
traditionalist views of society. Time and again, individual initiative, audacity, 
insubordination, and reckless leaps into the unknown showed that individuals could 
achieve their aspirations with hard work, perseverance, self-confidence, and a little bit 
of luck. They found the grounds for self-expression in the new value attached to the 
individual, to his or her aspirations, ingenuity, and capabilities; in classical liberalism, 
which asserted that good societies should allow individuals to attain the fullest extent 
of their potential; and in the design of the modern capitalist economic system. 
The new values asserted that competition and freedom of initiative lead to a 
more prosperous, efficient and, as a result, better society. They thereby contrasted 
markedly with traditional values, which emphasized coordination and regulation as 
the path to a strong, harmonious society with a rich social fabric. Traditional values 
were based on the certitudes of divinely-inspired social relations between the 
 11 
individual and the family, between the individual and his community or lord, between 
the subjects and their sovereign. 
In our previous work, we have emphasized the importance of economic 
culture to economic performance. This is the first attempt to study how individual 
beliefs and attitudes, as well as the prevailing economic values, affect individual 
career choices and economic innovation. In our empirical results, we report the 
beliefs, attitudes, and values that have significant effect on occupational choice, on 
the decision to create a new firm and on the subsequent individual income.   
 
2.4 Occupational Choice and Economic Innovation 
The goal of our empirical study here is to study the effect of education and economic 
values, beliefs and attitudes on the decision to join the civil service, the decision to 
create a start-up, and conditional on these decisions, on individual income. We 
perform our analysis using the classical Roy Model of occupational choice. Within 
this framework, we examine relative levels of income conditional on the selection 
choice of the individual. The analysis of individual decisions is conducted under the 
assumption of complete information and of no effect of individual choices on 
equilibrium wages and prices. While one important limitation of our framework is 
that it is static, we believe that it is nevertheless well-adapted to represent the choice 
to join public administration and, with some reservations, is also applicable to the 
decision to create a new firm.  
 We study the two choices using individual-level data for each of the following 
countries: China, Germany and the US. Due to data limitations we choose to study 
only people below the age of 40, which allows us to focus on firms that have been 
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created in the last 10 to 15 years. Thus, any heterogeneity in the companies and the 
possible implications of inheritance are limited.  
 As noted above, the goal is to see how education, inherent ability, individual 
beliefs and attitudes, and prevailing economic values affect individual choices and 
outcomes. For each country, we consider several specifications. We start with a model 
in which individual choices are driven entirely by observed demographic 
characteristics, the most important of which is education. Then we introduce 
economic values and individual beliefs and attitudes. The limitations in the data force 
us to maintain the assumption that individual beliefs and attitudes are stable over time. 
This is very strong assumption, but we find some comfort in the fact that in our 
previous analysis individual preferences about the workplace exhibited remarkable 
stability in the 1990s and the 2000s.  
 
3. Data 
We use individual level data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The data for the 
analysis of entrepreneurial activity comes from the surveys conducted between 1995 
and 2002. Unfortunately, data limitations have forced us to study the selection into the 
public sector on an alternative dataset based on the surveys from 2005 and 2006. The 
WVS contains data on self-employment status, individual income, size of firm, and 
profession, education, and some basic demographic characteristics of the responding 
individuals, who are selected to form a representative sample for each country. The 
data also contain a number of questions related to individual beliefs and attitudes 
towards competition, social trust, risk-aversion, and work preferences. A more 
detailed data description can be found in Bojilov and Phelps (2010).  
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4. Empirical Results 
The empirical results are organized in two subsections. The first is devoted to the 
creation and the success of new firms and the second to the choice to become a low or 
medium-level government official. What connects the two issues is the problem of the 
allocation of talent in the economy. We perform a comparative study involving China, 
Germany and the US.  The last section concludes by combining the insights from the 
previous two.  
 
4.1 Creation of New Firms 
We treat the income of the creator and manager of the start-up as the measure of 
success of a recently created firm. The reasoning behind this is simple: new firms are 
usually small or medium-size, private and the relation between the income of the 
founder and manager is strongly correlated with the performance of the company 
itself.  For the analysis, we use data from the WVS waves in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s. Unfortunately, of the unavailability of data for questions related to 
economic culture prevented us from also using the most recent wave. We recognize 
that investment decisions necessarily introduce dynamics into the analysis of the 
success of a new company. Nevertheless, we believe that, controlling for individual 
characteristics, it provides a proxy for the success of a new firm, similar to firm size. 
Also, since the analysis here is country-specific issues related to international 
differences in taxation, financial markets, etc. are somewhat mitigated. We have 
experimented with various specifications of education and report the one that is most 
generous to the effect of education. 
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 We start the analysis of decisions to create new firms in China and their 
success with a simple model  based only on individual demographics. The results are 
reported in Table 1. We find that women and older people  are less likely to create 
new firms. We find that higher education has a negative effect on the probability of 
creating a new firm. Conditional on creating such a firm,  education does not appear 
to have any effect on income, largely because of the relatively low educational 
attainment of the people who create firms in the first place. Thus, we find negative 
selection on education which implies that many new firms that are created in China 
are not particularly intensive in education-related assets. That is, Chinese firms tend to 
engage in adoption rather than frontier innovation which does  not require particularly 
high technical and scientific foundations. We also do not find any evidence for 
selection of workers with very high inherent productivity (ability from now on) in the 
creation of new firms. Finally, we also find relatively little variation in the income of 
















 Next, we consider a model that includes economic values and beliefs, reported 
in table 2.  The estimated results for the effect of  education, age, and gender remain 
virtually unchanged compared to the previous specification.  Again, we find negative 
selection in the creation of start-ups based on education. Women and older people are 
less likely to create new firms, but conditional on creating a firm, their income is not 
negatively affected by these individual characteristics. There is no evidence for 
selection on inherent ability.  
 Economic values, however, appear to play an important role in the decision to 
create a start-up. Still, what appears to be important is not the individual beliefs and 
attitudes, but the prevailing beliefs and attitudes in the region.  Awareness of the need 
to contribute has a positive and significant effect on the willingness to create a start-
up. Surprisingly, we find that people who want interesting and engaging work do not 
Table 1. China: determinants of the decision to create a start-up and 
of the following income, excluding economic values 
  Income Create Start-Up 
Explanatory variables: Coef. z Coef. z 
Female 0.0584 0.74 -0.1435 -2.5 
Age -0.0169 -0.7 -0.0138 -5.08 
age sqr 0.0002 0.59 0.0002 2.56 
Single -0.1673 -0.77 -0.7244 -5.84 
Child -0.2715 -1.37 0.0138 0.11 
years of education -0.0006 -0.04 -0.0316 -2.59 
years of education, sqr 0.0000 1.19 0.0000 0.53 
Constant 3.1514 5.15 -0.5122 -1.9 
          
Rho -0.0007 0.2168    
Sigma 0.7614 0.0257    
Lambda -0.0006 0.1651     
Obs. =  2721     
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select into the creation of start-ups. This finding suggests that most start-ups are not 
technological leaders in their sectors, an implication suggested also by the negative 
correlation with educational attainment. The dynamics of individual choice and 
regional acceptance of government intervention is complex. 
 Table 3 presents the results for Germany. Interestingly, the results based on 
demographics for Germany are very close to those for China. We find a negative 
effect from age and gender on the probability of creating a new firm, but conditional 
on creation these individual characteristics have no significant effect on income. The 
results indicate that education is not a major determinant of the decision to create a 
new firm nor on its subsequent success. Moreover, we do not find evidence that 
people with inherent high ability create new firms.  
 The individual beliefs and attitudes that motivate the Germans in creating their 
own companies is, however, very rich and diverse. Economic values appear to play a 
Table 2. China: determinants of the decision to create a start-up and of the 
following income, including economic values 
  Income Create Start-Up 
Explanatory variables: Coef. z Coef. z 
Female 0.0188 0.26 -0.1058 -1.62 
Age -0.0079 -0.37 0.0073 0.36 
age sqr 0.0001 0.32 -0.0002 -1.03 
Single 0.0023 0.16 -0.0504 -3.89 
Child 0.0000 1.3 0.0000 1.37 
years of education -0.1195 -0.61 -0.6567 -4.38 
years of education, sqr -0.2491 -1.31 -0.1077 -0.71 
possibility to contribute, region   3.9833 5.87 
interesting job, region   -2.4186 -3.94 
government intervention, region -1.0139 -2.61 -1.7317 -3.06 
government intervention, region sqr 0.1196 1.97 0.1704 3.2 
Constant 5.8616 3.68 3.2541 2.09 
          
Rho 0.0001 0.2562    
Sigma 0.6447 0.0234    
Lambda 0.0000 0.1652     
Obs. = 2721     
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crucial role. Patient people who do not insist on high pay immediately are more likely 
to create a company on their own, as this action is associated with considerable initial 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary investments. People who want increased freedom of 
initiative are also more likely to create a company of their own. The potential 
entrepreneurs are also willing to forgo some job security in order to try something 
interesting. Preference for leisure has a negative effect on income, conditional on 
entry. Intergenerational effects are very important, reflecting traditional values and the 
tendency of children to inherit some assets from their parents.  Finally, the creators of 
start-ups also do not believe in government intervention and do not believe that 
competition is  
harmful.  
 
Table 3. Germany: determinants of the decision to create a start-up and of 
the following income, including economic values 
  Income Create Start-Up 
Explanatory variables: Coef. Z Coef. z 
female -5.6499 -1.62 -0.3795 -3.94 
age 0.8901 1.05 0.0886 3.87 
age sqr -0.0114 -1.3 -0.0010 -4.15 
single 1.6729 2.41 -0.0240 -0.98 
child -0.0007 -2.22 0.0000 1.12 
years of education -0.5607 -0.08 -0.2155 -1.12 
years of education, sqr 6.1438 1.05 0.0940 0.6 
pay   -0.2378 -2.33 
not much pressure -7.1201 -1.93   
job security   -0.4318 -4.26 
initiative   0.4827 4.52 
possibility to contribute 3.0847 1.09   
interesting job, region   1.8522 2.24 
parents responsible for children 4.5312 2.18 0.0951 1.45 
government intervention   -0.0478 -2.44 
competition harms   -0.0601 -2.32 
constant -22.4028 -0.84 -3.0790 -3.82 
          
rho 0.1918 0.2760    
sigma 13.8739 1.1100    
lambda 2.6606 3.9457     






 Table 4 presents the results for the decision to create new firms and their 
success in the US. As with the other two countries, we find negative selection on 
female gender and age. However, these demographics appear also to have a negative 
effect on income, conditional on firm creation, which we find surprising. Education 
has a very interesting role for entrepreneurship. More educated people are less likely 
to create their own firms because of attractive alternative offers from already existing 
firms. However, if they enter, the returns to education are actually increasing with 
education. We believe that this finding provides evidence that US start-ups tend to be 
knowledge and skill intensive.  
 Moreover, we find that people with very high inherent ability are likely to 
create their own companies. The overwhelming part of the variation in income is 
explained by the variance in inherent ability, which is much higher than in China or 
Germany.  Somewhat surprisingly to us, the only two individual beliefs and attitudes 
Table 4. US: determinants of the decision to create a start-up and 
of the following income, including economic values 
  Income Create Start-Up 
Explanatory variables: Coef. Z Coef. z 
female -11.6734 -2.25 -0.2367 -3.28 
age 0.4087 2.48 0.0067 3.1 
age sqr -23.3390 -2.98 -0.2360 -2.09 
single -18.4112 -2.68 -0.2986 -3.04 
child 2.9054 3.56 0.0319 2.76 
years of education 0.0004 1.76 0.0000 -1.52 
years of education, sqr 2.5837 1.98 -0.2919 -3.84 
possibility to contribute 14.5886 2.67 0.1837 2.44 
achievement 17.2093 3.89 2.7203 4.31 
constant -28.8665 -6.68 -4.2355 -8.23 
          
rho 0.98 0.0008    
sigma 65.7921 5.2848    
lambda 63.7198 5.3062     
Obs. =6291     
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that appear to influence the decision to create a start-up in the US are the individual 
drive for achievement and desire to contribute to the welfare of the society. The 
motivation to achieve appears to be particularly strong.  
 The comparison between China, on one hand, and the US and Germany on the 
other shows some similarities in the effect of age and gender. We also find that in all 
countries education either has negative or no effect on the probability of creating a 
new firm. However, conditional on creating a firm, only in the US higher education 
has a strong positive effect on income. This result suggest that new firms in the US 
are more skill and knowledge intensive than their counterparts in China and Germany. 
We also find that Americans with inherent high ability are more likely to create new 
start-ups and that the variation in income among American entrepreneurs is highest.  
For all three countries, we found evidence of how individual beliefs and 
attitudes are closely related to the decision to create new firms and to those firms’ 
success. Yet, there are major differences across countries in the mix of beliefs and 
attitudes that propel people into action. The Chinese appear to take into account the 
prevailing economic values and beliefs in the community, while the Americans and 
the Germans are primarily driven by their own individual beliefs and attitudes. While 
for the Americans the most important issues are the drive to achieve one's full 
potential and the ability to contribute, Germans are motivated by a much more 
complex mixture of beliefs and attitudes. 
 
















4.2 Civil Service 
As above, we focus on the selection into civil service in China, Germany, and the US. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from simultaneously analysing the choice 
to become civil servants and the creation of start-ups on the same representative set of 
individuals. For this reason, here we utilize the latest WVS wave from 2005-2006 
while for the study of start-ups we used data from the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
 Table 5 reports the regression results for the income and selection into civil 
service for China. Our representative sample includes 1483 people interviewed in 
2005.  The results indicate that more educated people are more likely to select into 
civil service. Moreover, conditional on entry into the civil service their income grows 
considerably with each successive degree. Indeed, we find that the effect of graduate 
studies is between 50 and 100 per cent greater on income than the effect of college or 
some college education. The  results indicate that there are no decreasing returns to 
Table 5 . China: determinants of the decision to join the civil service and of 
the following income. 
  Income Civil Servant 
Explanatory variables: Coef. z Coef. z 
female 0.3375 2.37 0.1376 1.52 
age -0.0870 -2.14 0.0277 1.05 
age sqr 0.0012 2.83 0.0000 0.03 
single -0.0619 -0.14 0.3458 1.47 
child 0.1674 0.43 0.0431 0.19 
elementary 0.5480 1.61 0.6925 3.83 
complete professional 2.0608 3.98 1.8298 9.81 
complete college 1.4627 3.46 1.3282 7.53 
complete graduate 3.0258 4.09 2.7746 12.59 
individualistic    -0.1364 -2.94 
government intervention    0.0350 2.72 
government intervention, region    0.1080 1.94 
constant 0.1053 0.07 -4.3211 -6.19 
          
rho 0.8756 0.0989    
sigma 1.3785 0.2309    
lambda 1.2070 0.3356     
Obs.= 1483     
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education for the very higher education. This finding implies that young graduates 
will be attracted to apply for administrative positions in the public sector. We also 
find a high return to seniority exhibiting a classical concave shape.  
 The regression results show that there is a very significant, both economically 
and statistically, selection on unobservable productivity (ability from now on); the 
correlation between the error term in the selection equation and the error term in the 
observational equation is 0.88.  This result indicates that workers with high inherent 
ability tend to select into the public sector, rather than the private sector. The overall 
effect of this positive selection into the government sector  translates into an increase 
in the income, conditional on entry, by  about the same effect as a college degree.  
This result is quite extraordinary because in the presence of little variation in public 
sector compensation, implying very compressed income distribution, the very high 
positive selection must come from the extraordinary attraction of  administrative jobs. 
The results also indicate that the variation in income due to the heterogeneity in 
productivity is relatively small in China compared to the variation caused by 
observable characteristics, as well as compared to the variation in the other countries. 
 In terms of individual beliefs and attitudes, we find that less individualistic, 
possibly altruistic people enter the civil service. Furthermore, people who believe that 
the government should play an important regulative role and intervene to prevent the 
excess of the markets tend to become civil servants. Also, the general acceptance of 
government intervention in the region appears to have a borderline significant positive 
effect on the decision. Interestingly, China is the only country among the three where 
any prevailing values or beliefs tend to affect individual  choice. 
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 Our findings are good news for the quality of the labour force in the low and 
medium-level ranks in the government administration, but the question remains 
whether this is the best allocation of the brightest minds of a nation. We contrast these 
findings to those on selection and income in the civil service in the US and Germany. 
  Table 6 reports the corresponding results for Germany. We find that higher 
levels of education tend to increase the probability of becoming a civil servant. 
However, higher education does not have any effect on individual income, conditional 
on selection. Also, we find no seniority effect on income. Moreover, we find a very 
strong negative relation between inherent ability and entry in the public sector: people 
of high inherent ability are attracted by alternative jobs in the private sector or create 
Table 6. Germany: determinants of the decision to join the civil 
service and of the following income. 
  Income Civil Servant 
Explanatory variables: Coef. z Coef. z 
female -4.0453 -4.52 0.4074 5.27 
age 0.0254 0.15 0.0053 0.34 
age sqr -0.0008 -0.51 0.0000 0.21 
single -3.4304 -2.76 0.2646 1.89 
child -1.4327 -1.27 0.1168 1.03 
elementary 0.5467 0.37 0.0566 0.38 
some professional 2.6977 0.78 0.1994 0.7 
complete professional 1.1203 0.75 0.3769 2.51 
some college 2.2988 0.7 0.4953 1.42 
complete college 1.9142 1 0.8277 4.57 
some graduate -1.8997 -0.86 0.9400 3.85 
complete graduate 1.2658 0.65 1.1578 7.39 
government intervention    -0.0304 -2.32 
individualistic    -0.0845 -2.84 
constant 42.0752 7.16 -2.0110 -4.28 
          
rho -0.7604 0.1134    
sigma 7.9082 0.9450    
lambda -6.0135 1.5934     
Obs.= 1642     
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their own firms. Finally, the variation in income due to inherent ability in Germany is 
huge compared to that in China.   
 These findings suggest that the compensation schedule in China is very 
different from the compensation schedule in Germany. These differences imply that 
civil servants in China are paid on the basis of their degree of education and seniority 
with little room for variation in income on the basis of ability or performance. In 
contrast, most of the variation in the compensation of public administrators in 
Germany is due to inherent ability and education is only used as a screening device 
for entry. 
 Interestingly, we find that the people who join the German civil service tend to 
be those who believe in small and limited government in the context of economic life. 
Again, this is a major contrast between Germany and China. The only important 
similarity that we find between the two countries is that in both countries less 
individualistic people are more likely to join the public administration.  
 Table 7 reports the results for the US. We do not find evidence for a seniority 
effect on selection or compensation.  Also education also does not appear to play a 
role in the selection of workers into public service. In this respect, the US is even 
more extreme than Germany, where higher education played at least a role in entry 
into the civil service. Again, we find evidence for selection on unobservable ability. In 
particular, we find that workers of high ability prefer not to become bureaucrats. 
Similarly to Germany, variation in inherent ability accounts for much of the variation 
in income. 
 As in China and Germany, economic culture does appear to be important.  In 
the US, just like in Germany, people who do not believe in big government tend to 
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join the civil service. Also people who accept social change and the associated 
uncertainties are more likely to join. The government employees are also more likely 
to believe that competition sometimes does more harm than good. Thus, Americans 
tend to have a richer variety of personal beliefs and attitudes that motivate them to 
enter the civil service.   
To summarize, we find positive selection on inherent ability in China and 
negative selection in the US and Germany.  Moreover, the most highly educated 
people in China join the service, which is definitely not the case in the other countries. 
To the extent to which anecdotal evidence suggests that a worker of given ability is 
more productive in the private sector than the government sector, in particular 
government administration, Germany and the US appear to allocate their talent well.  
Chinese public administrators are paid  according to a rigid pay schedule based on 
education and seniority while German and American administrators are paid largely 
on the basis of inherent ability. 
  Moreover, we also find that individual beliefs and attitudes are very important. 
The perceived role of the government in economic and social life is a major 
determinant of individual choice in all three countries, but in China, unlike the other 
two, people who accept government intervention tend to join the government. This 
finding seems to suggest an important difference in the perceptions and motivations of 
the public administrations in China on the one hand and in Germany and the US on 
the other. In addition, we find that Chinese and Germans who are less individualistic 
tend to become civil servants, while Americans tend to have much more diverse 









Table 7. US: determinants of the decision to join the civil service and of the 
following income. 
  Income Civil Servant 
Explanatory variables: Coef. z Coef. z 
female -3.0511 -1.52 0.3140 2.52 
age -0.8797 -1.54 0.0313 1.05 
age sqr 0.0118 1.8 -0.0003 -0.99 
single -1.5148 -0.56 -0.1459 -0.93 
elementary -11.2457 -1.41 -0.5560 -0.86 
some professional 2.6644 0.3 -0.3367 -0.79 
complete professional -8.1776 -1.36 -0.3508 -0.99 
some college -2.7359 -0.44 -0.3203 -0.88 
complete college -2.9180 -0.48 -0.2473 -0.7 
some graduate -3.0887 -0.47 0.4364 1.16 
government intervention    -0.0596 -2.73 
competition is harmful    0.0529 1.99 
acceptance of social uncertainty    0.0999 2.25 
constant 70.9180 4.96 -1.8573 -2.32 
        
rho -0.7993 0.0937    
sigma 12.6023 1.7103    
lambda -10.0730 2.4634     






The preceding results suggest the following conclusions. The government in any 
developed or industrialized country is the largest employer with a share of between 12 
to 20 per cent of the labour force.  Of these, a large fraction are low or medium-level 
government officials. While they perform an important role and the attraction of the 
best and brightest is undoubtedly good for the quality of government services, it still 
remains an open question whether this constitutes the best allocation of talent from 
the perspective of returns on educational investment and inherent ability. Indeed, 
many studies show that low and medium-level officials are more productive in the 
private sector rather than as bureaucrats.  
 In our analysis, we tried to provide a positive description of the dimensions by 
which people select into the civil service or decide to create new firms, as well as 
their subsequent success conditional on their decisions. The results show that in the 
US the most gifted individuals do not go into public administration: they either work 
for private companies or create firms of their own. While the highly educated are 
more likely to go into public administration, their pay is not dependent on their degree 
of education but seems instead to be linked to inherent individual ability. Those 
Americans who are driven to achieve their full potential and want to contribute to the 
community are likely to create successful firms. Those who believe that excessive 
competition is harmful and accept social changes as well as believe in limited 
government interventionism tend to go in the public administrations. 
 
Table 13. Determinants of the decision to create a start-up and of 
the following income, excluding economic values: with country 
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effects. 
  Income Create Start-Up 
Explanatory variables: Coef. z Coef. z 
female -0.8318 -1.73 -0.5344 -31.16 
age 0.0823 0.79 -0.0009 -1.6 
age sqr -0.0016 -1.34 -0.0021 -1.65 
single -1.8475 -2.27 -0.2179 -7.74 
child 1.4884 1.9 0.0805 2.95 
elementary -0.1146 -0.21 -0.0334 -1.1 
some professional -0.7240 -0.91 0.0234 0.62 
complete professional 0.8273 1.1 0.0692 2.02 
some college 5.5422 4.61 -0.0092 -0.23 
complete college 3.2476 4.91 -0.0743 -2.25 
some graduate 8.1095 6.45 -0.0623 -1.52 
complete graduate 9.1907 9.04 -0.1474 -4.25 
constant 38.7217 13.16 -0.7387 -10.95 
        
rho -0.0092 0.0063    
sigma 12.4652 0.4533    
lambda -0.1151 0.0772     
Obs. 38208     
In contrast, we found that in China the highly educated and able enter the civil 
service, so the new firms that are created do not tend to be skill or knowledge 
intensive. Furthermore, we found that of all three peoples, the Chinese are most 
sensitive to the prevailing values and beliefs in the larger community when they make 
career choices. Interestingly, their choices seem to be influenced to a lesser degree by 
individual preferences, beliefs or attitudes. Finally, those Chinese who accept 
government intervention and share a less individualistic view of their place in society 
are likely to become civil servants.  
 Germany appears to be in between China and the US. On one hand, the most 
talented select into non-bureaucratic jobs as in the US and the compensation schedule 
in Germany is closer to that in the US than to that in China. On the other hand, the 
type and profile of the set of Germans who create new firms is actually closer to that 
in China than to that in the US. The results suggest that the brightest people in 
Germany opt to join established private companies, leaving the creation of new firms 
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to people of lower educational attainment. Still, the Germans exhibit the richest 
mixture of beliefs and attitudes when making career choices.  
 
5. Policy Recommendations 
The preceding analysis provides only a limited basis for policy analysis and 
recommendation. In what follows, we consider mainly policies that could potentially 
make the creation of start-ups more attractive relative to the alternatives. To the extent 
that economic innovation, particularly frontier innovation, requires talented and 
highly educated people, our results suggest that the Chinese economy possibly does 
not allocate its resources optimally. They also demonstrate that individual beliefs and 
attitudes are strongly related to career choices and further work on this issue is 
required. We believe that as the largest employer and the authority responsible for 
education, the Chinese state is in a position to alleviate any existing problems and 
create a good environment for economic innovation. Below, we outline some policy 
suggestions. 
Any country would like to have very qualified and talented people in charge of 
public policy, regulation, and management. There are also benefits of having good 
people at intermediate positions because they may be able to spot trends and 
information that remains for various reasons inaccessible to top management but 
which would be of value in the decision-making process. Yet, there is the danger that 
the prestige, generous pay, security, and non-pecuniary rewards of public 
administration jobs may deprive the private sector of highly qualified, managerial and 
entrepreneurial talent. 
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The numerous additional requirements that go with the creation and operation 
of a new firm present a major barrier to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs need not only 
have an idea and excellent knowledge of their market niche. They also need to be 
good legal experts, accountants, IT specialists, financial planners, and administrators. 
These additional requirements are coupled with the great risks associated with the 
introduction of something new from a position of complete obscurity, considerable 
debt exposure and the possibility of a very costly bankruptcy.  Thus, brilliant ideas, 
high motivation, patience, and fortitude are all required from future entrepreneurs.  
At the same time, the set of alternatives grows with education. A position in 
government administration is only one such alternative, but it is not the only one. 
Private companies try to attract the candidates with the best credentials in education, 
too. Thus, we focus on two related questions: What can be done to make 
entrepreneurship less costly? Would it be possible to encourage more people to 
become entrepreneurs without hurting the functioning of the government and the 
quality of the public services?  In what follows, we outline two sets of policies trying 
to address these questions. 
 
5.1. Civil Service 
Developments in information technologies and ‘big data’ analysis offer new 
opportunities for both the private and public sector. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the 
emerging information technologies helped streamline the operations of private 
institutions in the US and other developed countries by eliminating large portions of 
intermediate-level managerial positions whose role in the past had been the reception, 
processing, organization, and filtering of information. The public sector in all 
 30 
countries has been much slower in adopting these labour-saving technologies for a 
number of reasons, ranging from existing long-term employment contracts, to 
reluctance to abandon control and status, to absence of incentives to introduce new 
and better services to the public. We believe that the introduction of electronic 
government would have a number of advantages, one of which is maintaining the 
quality and extent of the public service but with fewer civil servants. The organization 
of such a centralized electronic system would also facilitate the streamlining of 
required documentation and reduce processing time. Furthermore, the transparency 
and the credibility of the public administration would grow when the review process 
becomes public. Last but not least, any reviewing or auditing institution can access 
the data on any specific case at any given time. 
 Information technologies can also be used to keep track of the internal 
operations of various units of the administration. Indeed, the recently developed 
research or analytics divisions of large companies rely on ‘big data’, large data sets 
containing an encoded minute-by-minute record of the operations of their companies, 
used to optimise in real time the operations of their different units and offered 
services. The benefits of such an information system would be great also in the public 
sector, particularly in countries like China where the public administration must 
operate in a fast-changing environment.  
 These innovations would have a number of advantages: the reduction in the 
need of large number of public servants is only one of them. In addition to improving 
centralized control over the implementation of policy, they also allow for quick 
feedback on the performance of policies, giving rise to potential suggestions for 
improvement. In short, “big data” allows, for the first time in history, a large 
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organization or government to apply statistical and economic analysis on all relevant 
data when formulating its policies. 
 
5.2. Entrepreneurship 
We focus on ways to reduce the barriers to entry and the costs of operations of start-
ups. The main issues that we consider are: access to credit and financial planning, 
access to new technologies, means to reach out to potential clients and partners, 
provision of specialized services, and the reduction of the risks and negative outcomes 
associated with creating new firms.  
Potential entrepreneurs have ideas and knowledge of local or specific markets, 
but they usually lack capital and, even more importantly, financial expertise.  Their 
projects are inherently risky which leads traditional financial institutions to lend to 
them at higher interest rates, if at all. Their high fixed payments, as a result, reveal the 
crucial importance of financial literacy and planning skills for the eventual success or 
failure of the new companies. However, many entrepreneurs have not graduated from 
business school, nor do they have degrees in economics or finance, so they cannot 
design viable business plans and are too small to hire an expert to do that for them. 
Thus, in many cases there are two related problems when it comes to financing: 
extension of credit and business and financial planning. 
Microfinancing has shown the way to extending credit to groups that have 
been excluded from traditional financial markets. Venture capital has also been on the 
rise in the last decades. These developments have gone a long way toward alleviating 
the problem of extending credit, and they suggest ways that can be done on a larger 
scale. Nevertheless, we think that there is still much work to be done in relation to 
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financial and business planning. Academic work and existing practice in economic 
development has shown that transferring assets to poor people has no or little effect 
compared to transferring assets and expertise on how to use them. The environments 
are different, but we suspect that a similar conclusion also applies in the context of 
entrepreneurship. We believe that a possible solution would be to create institutions 
that offer financial advice in the creation of viable business plans and help 
entrepreneurs secure funding for their project in exchange for a claim on future profits 
or revenue. Such specialized institutions could play the role of an intermediary that 
matches venture capital investors with potential entrepreneurs. An intermediary of 
such sort would be sufficiently large to have a global reach and specialized 
knowledge of the financial markets. In addition, a specialized public institution, 
similar in nature to the US government-sponsored enterprises in the mortgage 
markets, can securitise the loans to small and medium-size firms and by doing so 
create a viable secondary market and free up resources for more lending to such firms. 
 A related issue is the cost of bankruptcy. New firms fail very often. It is 
crucial that the entrepreneurs are not punished for trying. Moreover, they should be 
encouraged to try again; most of the great American inventors and businessmen have 
failed at least a couple of times before they succeeded. Indeed, some argue that what 
made the US an economic and technological leader is the fact that it had a financial 
system that could recognize and write off failures, while not stigmatising the failed 
entrepreneurs.  
 Another issue with start-ups is their scale. New firms are often too small to 
have their own IT specialist or accountant, but nevertheless they require such services. 
As a result, non-specialists perform them, leading to lower productivity, delays, 
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problems, and misallocation of resources. That is, small companies suffer from the 
lack of productivity gains due to specialization. Another related issue is access to the 
best practices and technologies. Very often producers or distributors offer special 
discounts for buying large orders or new products. However, a single start-up could 
not take advantage of these quantity discounts; but if several firms pool their 
resources together, then they could obtain the lower prices, better services, and 
ensuing productivity gains enjoyed by a larger company.  
The emerging ‘sharing economy’ in the consumption of durable goods in the 
US suggests one possible solution to such problems: several firms can share the same 
resource because none utilizes the durable good fully all of the time. The basic idea is 
similar to that of the initial cooperative movement in the late 19th century and the 
early 20th century except that it does not rely on exclusive membership since modern 
technologies allow reputation to play a disciplining role. We think that the pooling of 
resources of several small or medium-sized companies with a common purpose to 
access specialized services is a very important way to address the problems associated 
with small scale. A variation on the same idea is to have a company that has a long-
term contractual relation with the small and medium sized companies to give them 
access to machines, software, services, or maintenance on demand in exchange for a 
fee or a claim to future profits. There may be an argument for  government 
intervention in the introduction of such companies:  at the moment,  few such firm 
exist, mostly in major economic centers such as  New York, where they offer small 
start-ups, often technology based, access to shared office spaces, technology 
exchange, etc. There is no viable market of small and medium-sized firms that would 
support them on a larger scale, but it is possible that such small and medium-sized 
 34 
firms do not exist because there are no such specialized firms offering access to vital 
intermediary products and services. Possible applications extend to the use of 
computer and peripheral hardware, software, specialized services, etc.  
We are aware that these ideas are still in the infancy of their practical 
application and many questions remain to be addressed. To our knowledge, there has 
also been no academic research on the sharing economy. However, the sharing 
economy already suggests exciting opportunities for greater utilization of production 
capacity, increases in productivity in small and medium-sized firms.  
 Finally, our results also indicated that individual beliefs and attitudes, as well 
as prevailing economic values affect career choices and outcomes. We do not know 
how these beliefs and attitudes are formed and we are far from sure that there is a 
‘correct’ set of beliefs and attitudes. For these reasons, we are reluctant to give advice 
on what  'correct' views people should have, if such views even exist. However, it 
seems fair to say that the educational system and the media should not create a 
climate in which individual initiative or desire for commercial achievement and 
success are perceived as shameful.  
 There is no known recipe for entrepreneurial success, which suggests that 
people find out what works in their circumstances through learning by doing. Thus, 
we think that schools and universities should give the opportunity to young students 
to experiment and get hands-on experience in business. The coursework should 
emphasize not learning facts, but methods and allow students to be creative through 
joined projects, simulation games, and interaction with business professionals, as well 




 In this paper we presented some evidence that public sector in China attracts 
highly educated and talented people, while those who create firms tend to have low 
educational attainment. Moreover, we have found that entrepreneurs in China do not 
stand out with their inherent ability relative to the people who select into alternative 
careers. These results are very different from those for the US. Americans with high 
ability tend to go in the private sector or become entrepreneurs. While it increases the 
attractiveness of alternative career paths, conditional on becoming an entrepreneur, 
higher education leads to greater business success, suggesting that American start-ups 
engage in frontier innovation. We then discussed some policy recommendations that 
may help increase the attractiveness of creating one’s own firm in China. Our main 
recommendations include:  (1) the creation of institutions that can disseminate 
knowledge of business and financial planning, as well as match entrepreneurs with 
venture capitalists; (2) government sponsored enterprises that securitise loans to small 
and medium size firms with the objective of reducing the price of credit and 
increasing its quantity; (3) implementation of practices in the emerging ‘sharing 
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